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RESUMO - Os jornalistas devem verificar as informações fornecidas por suas fontes. 
Contudo, alguns fatores como a precariedade no trabalho, o imediatismo e a credibilidade 
que eles dão, sobretudo às fontes institucionais, leva os jornalistas a não verificarem a 
informação. Vários códigos de conduta recomendam a obrigação de corrigir a informação 
assim que se descobre que um erro não-intencional foi cometido, mas os jornalistas 
não gostam de reconhecer seus próprios erros, nem de corrigi-los publicamente. Essas 
circunstâncias afetam a qualidade do discurso e também a credibilidade dos meios 
de comunicação. Ombudsmen preenchem parcialmente essa lacuna. Como resultado, 
fragmentos de notícias falsas, equivocadas, erradas ou enviesadas são publicadas por 
jornalistas, contrariando as regras de verdade e honestidade, sendo raramente retificadas 
por iniciativa própria. O artigo analisa a cobertura das armas de destruição em massa 
do Iraque, na qual, como em um jogo de imitação, o mesmo erro foi sendo repetido 
em diferentes meios e em diferentes países, apesar de alguns jornais prestigiosos 
publicarem um pouco usual pedido de desculpas.
Palavras-chave: Credibilidade. Retificação voluntária. Informação precisa. Qualidade do 
jornalismo. Ética. 
ABSTRACT - Journalists must verify information provided by their sources. However, 
factors such as job precariousness, urgency and the credibility they give to mainly 
institutional sources mean that journalists do not verify information. Most codes of 
conduct recommend the duty to correct information as soon as an unintentionally 
committed error is discovered, but journalists dislike recognising their own errors and 
even more so correcting them publicly. These circumstances affect adversely the quality 
of discourse and the credibility of mass-media. Ombudsmen partially bridge this gap. As 
a result, false, mistaken, wrong or biased pieces of news are published and journalists, 
against the rules of truth and honesty, rarely rectify on their own initiative. This article 
analyses the coverage of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction, in which the game of 
mimicry saw the same mistake repeated in different media and in different countries, 
although prestigious newspapers published an unusual public apology.
Keywords: Credibility. Voluntary rectification. Accurate information. Journalism quality. 
Ethic.
NOTÍCIAS FALSAS, INCORRETAS E INCOMPLETAS: 
Os desafios dos jornalistas em busca da retificação voluntária. A 
experiência espanhola
Copyright © 2012




207BRAZILIAN JOURNALISM RESEARCH - Volume 8 - number  2 -  2012
FALSE, INACCURATE AND INCOMPLETE NEWS: 
NOTICIAS FALSAS, INCORRECTAS E INCOMPLETAS: los retos que deben 
afrontar los periodistas en el proceso de rectificación voluntaria. La 
experiencia española.
RESUMEN - Los periodistas deben contrastar la información suministrada por sus fuentes 
informativas. Sin embargo, algunos factores como la precariedad laboral, la premura 
con la que se elaboran las informaciones y la credibilidad que se le da a las fuentes, 
principalmente a las institucionales, propician que el periodista no verifique ni contraste 
sus informaciones. La mayoría de los códigos de conducta recomiendan la obligación 
de corregir la información tan pronto como se ha detectado el error involuntario, pero a 
los periodistas no les gusta reconocer sus propios errores, y mucho menos corregirlos 
de forma pública. Estas circunstancias afectan a la calidad del discurso periodístico y la 
credibilidad de los periodistas y medios de comunicación. Los defensores de la audiencia 
suplen, en parte, este vacío. Como consecuencia, se generan, involuntariamente, 
informaciones erróneas o falsas, parciales o inventadas, y el periodista pocas veces 
rectifica el error por iniciativa propia. Este artículo analiza la cobertura periodística del 
tema de las armas de destrucción masiva en Irak, en el que, siguiendo un proceso de 
imitación, el mismo error fue reproducido por diferentes medios en diferentes países, 
aunque algunos periódicos prestigiosos publicaron una inusual disculpa pública. 
Palabras clave: Credibilidad. Rectificación voluntaria. Información precisa. Periodismo 
de calidad. Ética.  
INTROduCTION
In the mid-19th century, there was a shortage of news, particularly 
true and verifiable news. Technological advances had a marked influence 
on driving informative journalism. Now, in the 21st century, the flow of 
news is remarkable, and at times even excessive. Media bureaux have 
favoured source-based journalism, which is clearly seen on a daily basis 
in what has come to be called ‘journalism of assertion’ or ‘he said, she 
said’ journalism. The broadcast media have also smoothed the path. It is 
a programmed type of journalism with the opinions of sources acting as 
the backbone of the news genres. Also, this type of journalism is devoid 
of substantiation. Journalists rely blindly on institutional and confidential 
sources alike. 
However, at times, journalists publish inaccurate or false 
information because they have been manipulated or not given the 
correct documentation by the source. The affected reader has the right of 
rectification and their ombudsman intercedes between the reporter and 
the public to clarify inaccurate information. But only rarely, exceptionally 
rarely, does a journalist rectify on his own initiative. It is also true that 
rectifying may prove counterproductive because it may cause people who 
did not read the rectified text subsequently to take an interest in it. Thus, 
rectification paradoxically contributes to propagating the very fact that 
was intended to be rebutted. 
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This article seeks to promote a theoretical reflection on these 
issues, drawing on information provided by different sources. The 
literature review will allow the establishment of a framework covering this 
subject and the analysis of multiple tendencies and perspectives. Also, 
the coverage of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction will be analyzed, and 
this case reveals a uniform behaviour on the part of the press, persisting 
with the error regarding the existence of those weapons.
CONSIdERATIONS ABOuT TRuTh IN ThE NEwS
 Bill Kovach and Tom Rosenstiel, authors of The Elements of 
Journalism, devised a principle shared by all: journalism's first obligation 
is to the truth. They also add, however: ‘On this there is absolute 
unanimity and also utter confusion: everyone agrees journalists must 
tell the truth, yet people are befuddled about what 'the truth' means’ 
(KOVACH and ROSENSTIEL, 2007, p. 36).
Certainly, journalists have never been clear when referring to 
the truth. Kovach and Rosenstiel (2007, p. 41) blame journalists for their 
passivity, of being mere recorders of events, rather than selectors and 
editors. They add that originally, in principle, it was not the journalist 
who had to be objective, it was their method. Over the years, some 
journalists have suggested substitutes in the search for the truth. The 
most common of these could be impartiality and fairness. But neither 
suffices. Impartiality is an abstract and subjective concept. Equanimity 
is also subjective. In recent years, the press has opted for opinion-based 
interpretation too. In the 21st century, verification and synthesis must 
become the new guardian angels of journalists. As Kovach and Rosenstiel 
state, the need for truth is greater in this century, not smaller, given that 
the potential for lie-mongering is much larger. 
In their work Blur: How to Know What's True in the Age of 
Information, Kovach and Rosenstiel (2010) focus on the importance of 
verification, fact-checking and evidence in the media as a method of 
reporting, ‘the way of sceptical knowing’. They outline a method that 
citizens can use to discern the truth for themselves, in a context where 
the media face a deluge of portable, personalized, and participatory news. 
Thus, everyone must become an editor, assuming the responsibility for 
testing evidence and checking sources presented in news stories, deciding 
what it is important to know, and whether the material is reliable. This 
method requires six steps: identifying the nature of the content being 
consumed (journalism of verification, journalism of assertion, journalism 
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of affirmation, interest-group journalism, or journalism of aggregation); 
examining whether a news account is complete; steps three and four 
deal with sources: the identity of those sources and the nature of the 
evidence that is adduced; the fifth step is to consider whether there is 
an alternative explanation; and finally, exploring whether the news is 
providing what is needed. 
 Niceto Blázquez (1994, p. 208-212) emphasises the concept 
of truth and states that this term applies when recipients learn of the 
truth through the media. In other words, it is the truth or reflection 
of reality that the informer ascertains and communicates to people as 
faithfully as possible using the mass media. However, they distinguish 
between informing objectively (referring to things as they stand in their 
own context, without manipulation or distortion) and being truthful (it 
may not necessarily coincide with exactly how things are in their pure 
objective state). From this, Blázquez infers that the truth always refers 
to reality to the extent that it is known, rendering truth an analogical 
concept, which can be told from many different realities.
 The journalist is not always present when the event they aim 
to report on occurs. As a result, they are conditioned by or subjected 
to the version that sources offer of the event. It is also true that access 
to certain information will always be influenced by the sources. The 
journalist consequently publishes the reality they know or are given 
by sources. Blázquez (1994) justifies the journalist's role because they 
safeguard their moral honesty by being truthful, by telling the facts 
as they understand them after adequate investigation and verification. 
Nonetheless, what is said may not necessarily be the absolute truth. 
Veracity in many cases is whatever is morally possible, and therefore is 
the safeguard of journalists’ honesty.
 Thus far, attention has been devoted to the process of verification 
before the publication of a news story. The journalist may err without 
intending to, either because they have been misinformed or because 
sources have misled them or provided them with inaccurate information. 
The problem lies in the fact that the journalist generally does not verify 
the information supplied by sources. They give sources unreserved 
credit. Yet the source's commitment is not always underpinned by the 
same honesty, as is the case with journalists. 
It may be that journalists, under pressure to produce news, do 
not have enough time to substantiate and verify facts, data, numbers, 
comments or dates. But in other instances too, when information 
comes to light, the journalist detects pitfalls and checks if the news is 
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inaccurate, incomplete or false. They publish it in good faith, believing 
that their news reality is reliable. However, even if they know they are 
wrong, they do not rectify mistakes. Journalists must aspire to tell the 
truth and, when they are wrong, rectification is the most appropriate way 
to correct the error because if they fail to carry this out, they mislead. As 
Blázquez (1994) points out, the informer who is not truthful, misleads. 
From then on, they lose the right to inform. Making a mistake may be 
ethically correct. Deliberately misleading never is. 
dISINFORMATION FROM INFORMATION SOuRCES
The best source of information is the event or fact itself, 
advances Alba Sánchez in an El Nacional article called The Trap, on 23 
November, 2004. If the journalist is present when the event occurs, there 
is no problem, as they are both the witness and source to everything 
that happens. But this is not always the case, and, as Burgueño (1997) 
explains, journalists do not have the gift of ubiquity and this is precisely 
where the dilemma lies. As a result, the journalist must rely on their 
sources, yet not all sources are reliable. Casals Carro (2005, p. 109) 
rightly states that the relationship of the journalist with information 
sources is the main problem in journalism. Certainly, the journalist draws 
on information sources to produce their own text. In certain cases, it 
could be said that these may even condition the work routines of the 
informer and their take on the facts, especially when they are concerned 
about losing access to information sources used on a daily basis. 
 In any case, none of the information sources can prevent 
professionals from spreading rumours, indoctrination, non-events, 
disinformation, pseudo-events, trial balloons, scoops, or invented, 
inaccurate, incomplete, biased or false news. Nowadays, the journalist 
tends not to substantiate or verify the content of the sources, especially 
if the latter are public or institutional. They put all their trust in them and 
reporters have become more relaxed. However, as Kovach and Rosenstiel 
(2010, p. 78) explain: ‘credentials alone are insufficient’. The employment 
situation, of course, is changing work routines. Job insecurity has led 
the journalist to adopt a more passive and cosy, but less committed, 
attitude. This can also be noticed in the topics tackled, the poor quality of 
the sources drawn on to produce the stories, in the quality of the writing 
and the handling of a scant number of journalistic genres.
 More significantly, there is the limited number of rectifications in 
the different media that the journalist makes public on his own initiative. 
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The journalist is not blameworthy when they are wrong. In the words of 
Niceto Blázquez (2005, p. 208-212), the journalist protects their moral 
integrity merely by being truthful and recounting facts as they know 
them, after adequate investigation and verification. However, what is said 
is not necessarily the absolute, objective truth. The absolute objective 
truth is the ideal. Veracity is what is morally possible in many cases, and 
therefore, what really protects their integrity.
 Nevertheless, journalists get facts wrong, make unintended 
mistakes, and mention only the part of the reality they know about. 
Meanwhile, their integrity remains intact. After the information is 
published, the journalist detects the mistake, the lie, the fiction and 
deceit. But they do not normally rectify facts, and least of all opinions. 
As Kovach and Rosenstiel (2010, p. 119) explain, no one demands much 
more than a correction when an analysis is wrong. Mea culpa tends to 
be offered for mistakes of a more clear-cut nature, even if they are more 
innocent (misspellings, misidentifications or typos in addresses).
Blázquez (1994) is categorical about this, stating that in order 
morally to compensate for involuntary flaws in objectivity, codes of 
conduct recommend the duty to correct information as soon as the 
unintentionally committed error is discovered. The informer who informs 
truthfully may be wrong, but cannot be morally accused of deceiving the 
public if there was no culpable negligence and they are prepared to make 
amends.
 Nevertheless, if the journalist does not rectify inaccurate news 
that is already published, can they be accused of deceiving the public 
or of negligence? The truth in news may also be published in a series of 
instalments, but it must be done. Rectifying is for the wise and also for 
journalists.
 Most probably, as Kovach and Rosenstiel (2007) point out, the 
root of the problem is that the journalist is unaware that objectivity 
is the main tool for making the method effective. Journalists must be 
subjective, honest and wary. They should not consider information 
provided by sources as definitive and good, and should ask the source 
for as much corroboration, evidence and proof as deemed necessary to 
be able to substantiate and verify the facts being added to the news mix.
dISINFORMATION ANd wEAPONS OF MASS dESTRuCTION IN IRAq 
COvERAgE
It is also worth asking, for instance, whether US journalists were 
fulfilling their obligation when they reported on the statements made 
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by President Bush about the existence of weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD) in Iraq, even though it would subsequently be shown that these 
weapons did not exist. Of course, Bush made these statements and 
he is consequently responsible for them. However, this logically raises 
the question of whether the journalist's function is to attend a press 
conference and repeat everything he is told there, without requesting 
further documentation or verifying what they have been told. Not a 
single journalist did. Journalism of assertion is a dead-end alley which 
professionals would be well-advised to avoid. Today, one can only 
imagine how many journalists and newspaper companies were absolutely 
convinced of the distant possibility that WMD did not exist. Time has 
passed, but the question still needs to be answered.
Spain was part of the coalition forces that invaded Iraq, arguing 
that it had weapons of mass destruction that represented a threat to 
international security. To reinforce this argument, on 5 February, 2003, 
the then US Secretary of State for Security, Colin Powell, attempted to 
present the media with irrefutable evidence which demonstrated the 
danger Iraq posed. Powell backed up his appearance with satellite images 
and graphics. According to a report published in Spain’s El País on 7 
February 2003, ‘in the US, the country’s leading newspapers gave huge 
credibility to Colin Powell’s arguments, and considered indisputable 
the absolute lack of willingness by Saddam Hussein’s regime to co-
operate with the UN’, while ‘in Europe more importance was given to the 
unconvincing nature of the evidence’.  Three days later, Bush announced 
that Iraq may have trained Al Qaeda in the use of biological and chemical 
weapons.
Nevertheless, the argument as to whether WMD existed in Iraq 
had already been brewing for months. In Europe, for example, various 
media published an unusual manifesto in the press on 30 January 
that same year. It was signed by eight European heads of state (Spain, 
Portugal, Italy, UK, Hungary, Poland, Denmark and the Czech Republic) 
with the title ‘United We Stand’. The manifesto said: ‘Our goal is to 
safeguard world peace and security by ensuring that this regime gives up 
its weapons of mass destruction’. The text stemmed from an initiative by 
The Wall Street Journal and was a response to the campaign orchestrated 
to justify the war. In the US, the Bush Administration had been pushing 
this message for months; it had appeared in prestigious dailies such as 
The New York Times, courtesy of specialised journalists such as Judith 
Miller. 
For Massing, the handling of the news on WMD is significant 
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because it also highlights a uniform, mimetic behaviour by the press: 
‘The contrast between the press’s feistiness since the end of the war 
and its meekness before it highlights one of the most entrenched and 
disturbing features of American journalism: its pack mentality. Editors 
and reporters don’t like to diverge too sharply from what everyone else is 
writing. When a president is popular and a consensus prevails, journalists 
shrink from challenging him’ (MASSING, 2004). In this game of mimicry, 
media have maintained the same mistake in almost every area, in an 
example of ‘clerkism’, the term adopted by the reporter Homer Bigat to 
define ‘the practice of uncritically accepting the official version of things‘ 
(KOVACH and ROSENSTIEL, 2010, p. 27). 
Kovach (apud EKAIZER, 2005)  maintains that the major 
newspapers, which played a critical role at other times, opted, for 
political and financial reasons, to adopt a principled stand: not to 
challenge George Bush’s government on the subject of Iraq; or in other 
words, to almost always give them the benefit of the doubt during war 
preparations, against a background in which the 7/11 attacks also help 
explain the role played by the press in supporting Bush during the 
preparations for the invasion of Iraq. ‘The attacks were used by the Bush 
Administration to create sensitivity in the media (…). We now know it was 
a carefully calculated operation’ (EKAIZER, 2005, p. 32). This patriotic 
atmosphere swept up newspapers as prestigious as The New York Times 
and Washington Post ‘For the neoconservatives, 7/11 was a golden 
opportunity to defend the stance on the Iraq war’, according to John J. 
Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt (2006), from Harvard University, who 
also stress the influence of the Israeli lobby and the neoconservatives on 
US foreign policy and the North American press. 
With the excuse that Iraq had WMD, the international coalition 
forces, led by the US, invaded Iraq on 20 March 2003 under the slogan 
“Operation Iraqi Freedom”. In Spain, the government faithfully toed 
the Bush Administration’s line and, the then prime minister, Aznar, 
emphatically maintained in a number of TV interviews that were widely 
reported in the press that the arms existed: ‘You and everyone watching 
can be sure that I’m telling the truth,’ he insisted, for example, in an 
interview broadcast on 13 February on Antena 3 TV. ‘The Iraqi regime 
has weapons of mass destruction; it has ties with terrorist groups and 
has demonstrated throughout its history that it is a threat to us all’. 
Although the media, which were ideologically aligned with 
the government opposition, openly declared themselves to be against 
intervention in Iraq (‘The war against Iraq is not just undesirable, 
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it is avoidable,’ said El País in the editorial ‘Iraq, an undesirable war’, 
published on 26 January 2003; and ‘for the first time, a government in 
democratic Spain is backing a war that is not supported or authorised by 
any international organisation, be it global, like the UN, or regional, like 
NATO and the EU in the case of Kosovo,’ in the editorial ‘Heading towards 
an Illegal War’, of 18 March 2003), they did not use sufficient resources 
to investigate the existence of WMD, even though it was already known 
from January 2003 that UN inspectors had found none after five weeks of 
searching, and that the declarations of El-Baradei, then Director General 
of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) had had some impact in 
Europe, when he questioned the validity of the evidence presented by the 
Bush government on the existence of WMD in Iraq. The report, which the 
Bush Administration ignored, did not have the impact in the US or Europe 
it needed to mobilise public opinion, or to make the media defenders 
of the public interest instead of broadcasters of the political agenda. In 
similar terms, Susan D. Moeller (2004), from the University of Maryland's 
Center for International and Security Studies, concludes that the media 
tended to lump together all types of WMD, gave too much credence to 
the administration's arguments and failed to air dissenting views.
Media pressure on the coalition forces when faced with 
allegations of manipulating evidence against Iraq over the existence of 
WMD, gained momentum in the more liberal media a few months after 
the invasion, when the first echoes from the international press were 
felt and when the opposition parties began to pressure the government 
for explanations. As early as 17 May 2003, Ernesto Ekaizer, a journalist 
at El País, suggested in a piece entitled ‘The Mystery of WMD’, that 
‘following a considerable number of false rumours, there is not a 
single sign of weapons that were brandished as the threat that needed 
to be eliminated through war’. Ekaizer insists there was a propaganda 
battle on WMD that began on Tuesday 5 February, with Powell’s press 
conference. Four months later, in September, El País announced that the 
‘1,400 US investigators were unable to find evidence of weapons of mass 
destruction’ (25 September 2003), despite the Spanish government’s 
insistence on the truthfulness of the story. 
In fact, in his speech to the US Congress, Prime Minister Aznar 
maintained that ‘the threat of weapons of mass destruction is real' (EL 
PAÍS, 25 February 2004). In February 2004, El Mundo compiled a list of 
the ten occasions when Aznar emphatically pointed to this threat.
In October 2004, the first news emerged that the US had been 
unable to find WMD from a report by experts commissioned to track 
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down the Iraqi arsenal. The team was headed by Charles Duelfer, of the 
CIA, who stressed that Saddam wanted, but was unable, to produce WMD 
and that Iraq’s nuclear potential had diminished, not increased, since the 
Gulf War of 1991. But it was not until January 2005 that the US finally 
abandoned its search for WMD after disbanding the units involved in 
the mission. It was only in 2007 that former Prime Minister Aznar first 
admitted there were no WMD in Iraq during a conference in Madrid. ‘My 
problem is I wasn’t smart enough to know about it earlier. No-one knew,’ 
he said.
On the role played by the media, Bob Woodward (EKAIZER, 2007), 
the journalist who investigated the Watergate scandal with his partner 
Carl Bernstein, said that it was extremely difficult for a journalist in 2003 
to find proof of the incorrectness or falseness of the assertion regarding 
WMD in Iraq. That would have required an investigation into these arms 
on Iraqi territory before the war -something that Saddam would not have 
allowed– although he acknowledged he was wrong not to have dug 
deeper. However, the media also erred in being too trusting of official 
sources, in abusing ‘the journalism of declaration’ and in their lack of 
a more interpretative journalism, which could have traced precedents, 
drawn connections between different pieces of information, analysed the 
US’s possible interests, and anticipated any possible consequences given 
that the world’s complex reality was strangled in the facts.
Kovach and Rosenstiel (2010, p. 44) consider that the case of 
misinformation concerning WMD shows the extreme effects of journalism 
of assertion, in which the news culture, technology, deadlines, rumours, 
innuendos, hypotheses, speed, passivity and culture of immediacy, lead 
to common mistakes. Assertions should be backed up with evidence. 
Journalism of verification tends to prioritize the evidence corroborating 
data (the two source rule), verifying information in a multiplicity of 
sources and seeking proof empirically. These authors recommend the 
method called ‘portable ignorance’ (KOVACH and ROSENSTIEL, 2010, p. 
103), developed by Homer Bigart during the Vietnam War. Bigart asked 
numerous simple questions and followed the thread of the answers until 
he knew more about the situation than anyone else.
Ramonet wonders why the main US media companies did not 
verify or question the statements made by the Bush Administration, 
explaining that a CIA field officer, Robert Baer, revealed how the system 
of news manipulation worked: ‘The Iraqi National Congress (INC) took 
information from false deserters and passed it on to the Pentagon. The 
INC then gave that same information to journalists, saying: 
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If you don't believe it, call the Pentagon'. That was how they 
managed to create a type of closed-circuit system with these 
news stories. The New York Times was thus able to say it had two 
information sources on WMD in Iraq. The same thing happened at 
The Washington Post. Journalists made no attempt to dig deeper. 
Meanwhile, editorial heads asked them to back the government. As 
patriots (RAMONET, 2005).
Some media also dwelled on these issues and apologised to 
their readers. The management of The New York Times, for instance, 
issued a mea culpa. After reviewing the published material in the 
prelude to the war and the early stages of the occupation, in an article 
published under the headline ‘The Times and Iraq’ (26 May 2004), they 
found that occasional ‘information that was controversial then, and 
seems questionable now, was insufficiently qualified or allowed to stand 
unchallenged’. The New York Times states that: ‘looking back, we wish 
we had been more aggressive in re-examining the claims as new evidence 
emerged -or failed to emerge’. The editors, however, insisted that the 
errors were institutional as opposed to individual: ‘Some critics of our 
coverage during that time have focused blame on individual reporters. 
Our examination, however, indicates that the problem was more 
complicated. Editors at several levels who should have been challenging 
reporters and pressing for more scepticism were perhaps too intent on 
rushing scoops into the paper’.  
Four days later, the paper’s ombudsman, Daniel Okrent, 
published a highly critical analysis entitled ‘Weapons of Mass Destruction? 
Or Mass Distraction?’ (30 May 2004) in which he pointed out that the 
newspaper’s coverage of Iraq in the months prior to the invasion and 
the following weeks, was ‘partial’ and ‘ingenuous’. Okrent analyses the 
practices that led The Times down this unfortunate path and highlights 
factors including: the hunger for scoops; the front-page syndrome; hit-
and-run journalism (the more surprising the story, the more often it 
must be revisited) and the coddling and anonymous sources. Also it is 
argued that: ‘The Times itself was used to further their cunning campaign 
(referring to the tactics of those who promoted the WMD stories) and 
stresses the paper’s institutional responsibility; but pinning this on Miller 
alone is both inaccurate and unfair’. 
Despite this, many media experts criticised the role of journalists 
at The New York Times. During the war, Judith Miller was invested in a 
special military unit whose mission was to find the weapons; while Michael 
R. Gordon, a defence correspondent, was responsible for coverage of 
the invasion. Michael Massing (2004) accuses her of putting too much 
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trust in Ahmed Chalabi as a source and in other Iraqi exiles who were 
obvious conspirators in offering the White House and the Pentagon the 
arguments needed to invade Iraq. But previously, Slate, The Nation, Editor 
& Publisher, American Journalism Review, and the Columbia Journalism 
Review had all run articles accusing her of being too eager to accept 
official claims before the war, and too enthusiastic to report the discovery 
of banned weapons afterwards. Meanwhile, Bill Kovach, assured readers 
in an interview published in El País (EKAIZER, 2005) that if the news from 
Judith Miller had been subject to an investigation similar to that into the 
work of Jayson Blair, it would have come to the same conclusion. Jayson 
Blair left the newspaper in 2003 after an internal investigation showed 
he was guilty of frequent deception in major stories: a systematic news 
fraud that consisted of copying, plagiarising, inventing, exaggerating 
and falsifying many of his articles, some of which were on the front page. 
In addition to The New York Times, The Washington Post joined 
the ranks of the US media which apologised. In this case, it was a 
personal initiative by reporter Howard Kurtz (2004), who usually covers 
media news and who published the column Media Notes several times 
a week on the paper’s website. The article slammed the Post for failing 
to scrutinize vigorously the Bush administration’s claims about Iraq’s 
supposed WMD and for relegating articles that did challenge the White 
House view to inside pages where they would receive less attention and 
cause little fuss.
This public mea culpa shows an interesting and unusual example 
of integrity and responsibility. In Spain, the game of mimicry has not 
been applied in this case, so clear apologies have not been published, 
although the El País ombudsman said on 5 April 2009, in reference to 
this and other issues that ‘we journalists must never forget that our first 
obligation is to seek the truth and this is based on facts, not on versions 
that blindly follow propaganda strategies’.  
Professor Labio maintains that the Iraq conflict is proof that 
manipulation can assume many guises. Despite the lie about WMD, 
information was hidden (the German newspaper Die Tageszeitung 
revealed that the US government removed 8,000 of the 11,800 pages 
in the original report about WMD submitted by the Iraqi government 
to the UN), efforts were made to censor news gathering (prior to the 
invasion of Baghdad, the Pentagon asked journalists to leave the Iraqi 
capital), to control journalists sent to the conflict (it ensured it included 
well-established informers in the military units), omissions were made 
(such as those relating to human rights violations and the murders 
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of journalists). In Iraq, thousands of civilians and over 200 journalists 
died, according to French NGO Reporters without Borders, including the 
Telecinco cameraman José Couso and El Mundo’s correspondent Julio 
Anguita Parrado. As in other wars, the first casualty was the truth. 
TRuThFuL INFORMATION ANd duE dILIgENCE By ThE jOuRNALIST
In an interesting article published in the ABC newspaper, 
‘Truthful Information and the Journalist's Due Diligence’, on January 
14 2002, Professor of Information Law Luis Escobar de la Serna (2002, 
p. 64) points out that, where truthfulness is concerned, the Spanish 
Constitutional Court does not demand absolutely incontrovertible facts 
but that the informer be diligent in investigating them. Because of this, 
he warns that inaccurate information is inevitable in an open discussion. 
This means that if ‘truth’ were imposed as a condition for recognising 
the law, the only guarantee providing a legal safeguard would be silence. 
The author acknowledges that narrating the event or news story involves 
their subjective participation in two ways: firstly in the way they interpret 
the sources used to prepare the story; and secondly, in deciding how 
to convey it so that the news is broadly the result of a reconstruction or 
interpretation of real facts.
 In terms of diligence by the journalist and their medium in 
investigating the truthfulness of the information being communicated, De 
la Serna notes that truthful information under article 20.1d) of the Spanish 
Constitution, means information that is checked in accordance with the 
rules of news professionalism, and excludes inventions, rumours and 
innuendos. Similarly, the author notes that for the Spanish Constitutional 
Court, due diligence by the informer is also demonstrated when they 
rectify inaccurate information. In these exceptional cases, it adds, when 
‘the informer’s diligent and responsible attitude is being investigated 
(Ruling 40/1992 by the Constitutional Court), it is important not to lose 
sight of the subsequent timely correction of the published information’. 
Indeed, the addition of a rectification, if produced spontaneously on the 
initiative of the author of the information or the newspaper that issued 
the news, or at the instruction of the affected party, is clearly ‘revealing 
of the attitude of the newspaper or journalist in search of the truthfulness 
of what has been reported’.
 On this subject, Camilo Osorio Isaza, Colombia's Attorney 
General, has written that all professionals, and particularly communicators 
‘carry moral baggage, which acquires sense and merit based on the 
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awareness that each of them has of what their personal dignity is worth’ 
(Osorio Isaza, 2003). However, fortunately, it is only on rare occasions 
that the error becomes the prominent element in the events; the 
journalist, feeling cornered and harried, must make amends, as best 
and as soon as they can, before the public shows their eternal distrust. 
Osorio Isaza believes that by publicly acknowledging errors and adopting 
clarity and transparency, credibility can be earned. The reader obviously 
appreciates this level of sincerity. Nor can it be forgotten that rectification 
is a mechanism that provides the opportunity to offer the complete truth 
of the facts, even if it is piecemeal and made public on two occasions. 
However, ultimately, the outcome of rectification becomes a credential of 
authenticity and responsibility. 
CAN RECTIFICATION PROvE COuNTERPROduCTIvE?
At times, rectification does not fully make amends from the 
point of view of a party deeming themselves negatively affected. 
Sometimes, rectification may also be counterproductive. That is the 
opinion expressed by Casasús, who considers that: ‘Some readers, who 
did not read the rectified text, are then prompted to take an interest in it. 
In this case, rectification paradoxically contributes to the propagation of 
what was intended to be rebutted’ (CASASÚS, 2001a).
 He insists that this collateral effect should be considered when 
a journalist is ready to rectify, but adds it should not prevent ‘the tonic 
of rectification being administered if the person affected believes it is in 
their best interests’ (Casasús, 2001b). Nevertheless, Casasús dispels any 
doubt further on:
Rectification of what the news media disseminate is a right that 
protects everyone. But more than anything else, it is a moral 
obligation, an ethical principal, a deontological commitment that 
all reporters must respect, with or without laws that regulate them. 
Rectification is a fundamental duty (CASASÚS, 2001b). 
 Rectification may at times be counterproductive but, in any case, 
the consequences of adopting the opposite position, in other words a 
refusal to rectify, may be even more detrimental. Often, as Desantes 
points out, published news is not true not because it is absolutely false, 
but because it has been published prematurely (DESANTES, 1976, p. 
115). This generally tends to happen with expected deaths. Instances are 
more common in the digital media, where pressure for immediacy and 
content updating is greater, yet urgency has also spelled trouble for the 
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printed and broadcast media. This was evidenced, for example, when 
TVE and CNN+ announced the death of singer Rocío Jurado two days 
before she actually passed away, or when CNN+ reported the death of 
Pope John Paul II while he was still dying. 
There have been many instances of ‘untimely’ deaths, even on 
the front page. For example, in its online edition of 29 December 2006, 
El País published ‘Fidel Castro dies’ on its front page. The elpais.com 
website kept the headline on its home page for some minutes, long 
enough for it to be detected and reported. El País rectified by deleting 
the headline but did not give any explanation regarding the error. For 
a quality newspaper like this, that explanation might have caused less 
damage to its credibility.
Cronkite (1996, p. 63) laments that the press is losing credibility 
mostly because of its lack of accuracy. But what he demands above all 
else is the ability to correct and rectify mistakes and that the correction 
be given the same prominence as the error. Aguilar has written along 
similar lines:
Some days ago, a newspaper wrote that a famous former footballer 
was being investigated for alleged drug-money laundering. A few 
days later, the footballer in question refuted the information point 
by point. The news was published in four columns on an odd-
number page; the refutation was hidden like a letter to the editor. 
While this situation persists, we will not be credible (AGUILAR, 
2004, p. 8).
TOwARdS A CuLTuRE OF RECTIFICATION
 The points that have been discussed are not recent developments, 
as demonstrated in the International Principles1, the most universal 
document of rules in the area of professional ethics in journalism, 
approved by the UNESCO General Assembly on 21 November 1983. 
Article 5 sets out the following: ‘The nature of the profession demands 
that the journalist promote access by the public to information, and 
participation of the public in the media, including the right of correction 
or rectification, and the right of reply’.
 Another code of conduct with far-reaching territorial reach is 
the declaration on professional conduct adopted by the International 
Federation of Journalists2, which is also categorical: ‘The journalist shall 
do the utmost to rectify any published information which is found to be 
harmfully inaccurate’.
 In the case of humanitarian catastrophes and tragedies, Hugo 
Aznar refers to journalists’ ethics, recognizing that particularly in such 
situations, journalists need to be aware of ethical considerations, writing: 
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The ethical demands for committed and quality journalism become 
even more fundamental in a situation of crisis. From tightening 
obligations -such as checking the news or its attribution, immediate 
rectification, etc. -to applying those obligations required by a 
special situation. Service logic must prevail more than ever in the 
work of the media in these situations (AZNAR, 2005, p.  88). 
 Among other documents, it is worth making a final reference 
to the Journalists' Style Guide Manual, which was used at the Forum 
for Immigration (2000) and the Association of Journalists of Vizcaya, to 
protect the culture, rights and image of immigrants in the news. This 
document states that: ‘Rectifications of information referring directly or 
indirectly to foreign non-EU residents should be accepted as standard 
and beneficial practice for the press. Rectification must be spontaneous 
and prompt. We must move towards a culture of rectification’. 
 The style guides used by different newspapers devote a 
significant amount of space to the issue of rectifying. However, they 
devote neither the space that these issues deserve nor the required clarity. 
Many style guides make reference only to errata and minor aspects that 
raise questions as to the journalist's diligence in rectifying. 
PERSISTINg wITh ThE ERROR IS SOMEThINg jOuRNALISTS dO
Among other functions, all ombudsmen should be vigilant that 
these norms are adhered to, remind people that they are in place and 
promote the practice of this professional obligation even if it is ‘not 
always gracefully accepted as a matter of fact by those who should 
comply’. This is the opinion held by Casasús (2001b), who recognises 
that this is a generalised phenomenon. He recalls that during a meeting 
of ombudsmen in Paris, it became clear that ‘there is the occasional 
journalist in any editorial office who still reacts churlishly and goes on 
the defensive when faced with the basic duty of rectifying’.
 His predecessor in that position at La Vanguardia, Roger Jiménez, 
explained this attitude by professionals in an interview with Daniel 
Capella for the Capçarela press magazine, in April 1994: ‘No-one likes 
to see their own name being cited for a mistake but we have to be aware 
that all of us make mistakes and have to overcome the excessive fear we 
have in acknowledging it in Spain’. De la Serna, erstwhile Ombudsman 
at El País, expresses himself in the same terms in statements published 
by the Diario de Navarra newspaper on 5 November 1993: ‘When I show 
up at the editorial office with a piece of paper, I see people watching me 
pass by and expressing relief when I move along. Nobody likes admitting 
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to making a mistake and even less so if it is going to be published’.
 In fact, journalists dislike recognising their own errors and 
like correcting them publicly even less. One need only skim through 
a newspaper to appreciate that rectifications made on the journalist's 
own initiative are highly unusual and almost never occur. To a certain 
degree, ombudsmen in the broadcasting sector have re-established this 
responsibility which news professionals have disregarded at their desks. 
However, their work often amounts to little more than nuances of style, 
offering explanations on published news, correcting unclear titles, and 
so on. 
 There is another complication: in Spain, few media have this 
type of ombudsman. Hence, not even the role played by ombudsmen 
can compensate for the shortage of rectifications needed in the 
Spanish media. This is even more the case when professionals do not 
seem particularly set on addressing this skewed situation. Possibly 
exaggerating in his explanation, the ombudsman at the sensationalist 
newspaper The Sun said ironically of his colleagues in the profession: ‘To 
err is human, to persist with the error is something journalists do’. Javier 
Darío Restrepo, the readers’ ombudsman at El Colombiano, also writes: 
The journalist insists on their error out of vanity, and thinks they 
will lose professional standing if they admit they were wrong; 
or they stubbornly refuse to revise the underlying arguments in 
their statement because they are obstinately convinced that they 
are right; or through fear of being disciplined by their superiors. 
Whatever the reason, persistence with the error is not typical of 
the journalist; it is the exception that proves the rule (RESTREPO, 
2002).
 Professor Hugo Aznar, from Valencia University, also looks at 
the position taken by the media and professionals, again with the aim of 
proposing a change of attitude: 
Since the media lives off the credibility afforded to them by the 
public, it has been standard policy to do whatever is possible to 
cover up their errors. However, the end result of that policy is 
counterproductive. The public ends up with a less than positive 
image of the media and the members of the profession, seeing 
them as one of the most arrogant and inept groups when it comes 
to acknowledging their faults. Attitudes need to change. Given that 
the work of the media is to scrutinise other institutions, it is not 
particularly clear - and the public realises this - why they exclude 
themselves from the healthy practice of criticism (AZNAR, 1999, 
p. 176). 
 Restrepo (2002) believes that the reader has ceased to believe 
in infallible newspapers, people or institutions that hide their errors and 
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balk at admitting them. In its Code of Practice, the Press Complaints 
Commission, the independent self-regulatory body for the British 
press, stresses that any inaccurate, misleading or distorted information 
‘should be promptly corrected and with due prominence,’ and also 
where appropriate, ‘an apology published’. Restrepo understands that 
the newspaper offers intangible products: accuracy and credibility. He 
therefore adds that ‘whenever an inaccurate news story reaches readers, 
the newspapers’ obligation is to correct, clarify or rectify as clearly and 
effectively as a certain car manufacturer did when it replaced defective 
wheel rims. There is no reward in this act. It is an act of justice because 
the client must be supplied with the product they have been offered to 
buy. And the reader is a client who is purchasing accuracy and credibility’. 
CONCLuSIONS
The implementation of the culture of rectification is sought, 
in theory, as the result of a long journey. But no forward steps will be 
made unless the profession acknowledges the need for such change. 
Journalists, working with the mass media as a whole, must be willing 
to reject journalism of assertion and passive journalism, to condemn 
press conferences where questions are not allowed; they should reject 
their role as simple mouthpieces for institutions and raise the banner of 
objectivity as a method, and ethical subjectivity and honesty as necessary 
tools for promoting the truth. For the reward to materialise, it needs to 
be nurtured by substantiating and verifying facts, and rectifying if news 
sources mislead when people are mistaken.
 NOTES
1  The International Principles of Professional Ethics in Journalism were 
prepared as an international common ground and source of inspiration 
for national and regional codes of ethics, to be promoted autonomously 
by each professional organization through ways and means most 
adequate to its members. 
2  The International Federation of Journalists adopted the IFJ Declaration of 
Principles on the Conduct of Journalists at the Second World Congress 
in Bordeaux in April 1954, which was amended at the 18th IFJ World 
Congress in Helsingör in June 1986. 
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